Risk-driven requirements elicitation represents an approach that allows assignment of appropriate countermeasure for the protection of the Information System (IS) depending on the risk level. Elicitation of safety requirements based on risk analysis is essential for those IS which will run on the open and dynamic Internet platform. Traditionally, misuse cases are used to find the weak points of an IS but cannot differentiate between the weak point that can lead to lenient hazard and/or serious hazard. In this paper, we present an enhanced misuse case approach to support IS safety risk assessment at the early stages of software process. We extensively examined and identified concepts which constitute a modelling technique for IS safety risk assessment and build a conceptual model for achieving IS safety risk assessment during the requirement analysis phase of software process. The risk assessment process follows an approach of consequential analysis based on misuse cases for safety hazard identification and qualitative risk measurement. The safety requirements are elicited according to the results of the risk assessment. A medical IS is used as a case study to validate the proposed model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Safety, which is one of the main qualities of Information System (IS), has attracted attention from some safety-critical organizations e.g. hospitals. A safety critical IS can be defined as a system where users and the safety of property are completely dependent on the right operation and utilization of the IS [1] . Safety-critical organizations face continuous safety hazards originated from failures and errors related to the systems and their users. Most incidents related to IS are originated by different technical and human factors like errors, mistakes, oversight, technical failures, etc.
Hazards analysis is directly connected to the requirements analysis of IS. The requirement engineering (RE) community continues to address the challenging issues of increasing IS quality while decreasing the cost of development [2] , [3] . While the majority of hazard analysis is traditionally performed during the design phase [4] , the analysis during early The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Xiao Liu . stages of IS development does not use the same conceptual model as the general RE process [5] , [6] . This raises challenges for the integration of the application conventional safety analysis technique with the rest of IS requirements analysis phase [7] . From a software perspective, developing safety-critical systems in the numbers required and with adequate dependability is going to require significant advances in areas such as specification, architecture, verification and the software process [1] . This study presents advancement in RE phase by enhancing this activity of the software process. In addition, its aims to address the challenge of integrating hazard analysis with the analysis performed during RE phase.
A. MOTIVATION
This study is motivated by the following facts: 1) Every organization is exposed to uncertainties due to risks and managing them is not an easy task. Limited resources usually make it very difficult to mitigate all the risks because the cost of mitigation mechanisms is high leading to a relevant reduction of Return On VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Investment (ROI). New improved approaches should contribute to a good ROI. 2) The traditional safety risk analysis methods are mostly technical so it is challenging for requirements engineers to effectively associate them to potential IS users and stakeholders' participation. New improved approaches should ensure this connection. 3) Subsequent to identifying and assessing possible hazards, there is a possibility of capturing and adding functional requirements in the system specification. Therefore, there is a need for an improved technique for hazard identification, assessment and safety RE. 4) Traditional background safety risk analysis is frequently focused on technical failures but there is a need to investigate natural hazards, accidental human errors and deliberate human actions impacting via existing vulnerabilities. New improved approaches should ensure this extended scope of analysis.
This research is aimed at achieving an effective assessment of possible safety risks during the RE process with the intention of having a positive Return on Investment (ROI).
B. CONTRIBUTIONS 1) We have developed a qualitative risk assessment method integrated within the RE process which helps stakeholders to identify the risks related to a particular activity/task 2) This work induces the awareness of safety issues in the organization and provides a way for cost/benefit analysis of safety measures to counterbalance the possible hazards at the early stage so resources can be allocated to most critical risk mitigation actions.
3) The proposed method helps organizations to prioritize safety risks depending on the assessment previously carried out so that highest impact risks can be promptly attended to.
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 defines some basic terms used in this paper. Section 3 presents the literature review including a survey of state of the art concepts as well as safety analysis concepts extraction from literature and their alignment. Section 4 presents the research methodology including the enhanced misuse case model for IS Risk-based Safety RE (R-SRE), followed by a case study in section 5 and a presentation of the model's benefits. Section 6 presents the discussion followed by the conclusion and suggestion of future areas of research in section 7.
II. DEFINITION OF TERMS
Rushby [7] states that safety is concerned with the occurrence of accidents or mishaps-which are defined as unplanned events8 that result in death, injury, illness, damage to or loss of property, or environmental harm. The further use of ''safety'' is concerned basically with the significance of external outcomes. The meaning of the word ''safety'' varies based on the context of its usage and has different definitions in various industries .: This paper adopts some term definitions based on IEEE Standard for Software Safety Plans IEEE 1228-1994 [37] . Some of these definitions are the following ones:
Risk: A measure that combines both the likelihood that a system hazard will cause an accident and the severity of that accident.
Software Hazard: A software condition that is a prerequisite to an accident.
Software Safety: Freedom from software hazards. Based on this notion, we formulated the following definition of safety within the context of the goal of this paper.
Software safety is therefore defined as the freedom from undesired outcome leading to major system damage, loss of the system or loss of property. These undesired outcomes could be as a result of intentional actions or unintentional misuse cases. The unintentional cases are accidental incidents such as mistakes, natural events, failures or faults, unlike intentional actions which mostly are deliberate incidents such as malicious actions and abuses of privileges. Safety in IS include the deliberate acts of working efficiently, effectively with minimal effort. These deliberate actions can be featured as skeptical, crafty and ignorant. The intentions related to both kinds of actions in IS safety is not only destructive but its outcome can be grievous.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
Several contributions have been made by previous researchers [12] and industry experts on advancing safety in the industries. Safety risk assessment is one of the four main elements when designing a safety management system [13] . However, this has been mostly concentrated around control systems and software-intensive embedded control systems as evidenced in [11] , [14] , [15] . This section gives a detailed review of related studies in the areas of misuses cases with risk assessment for improving safety. Misuse case has been investigated in the light of security, security risk management, security risk assessment and similar aspects as evidenced in [26] - [28] .
There are few research studies that had investigated IS safety hazards identification and RE. Olawande et al. [16] introduced an easy starter for identifying potential system safety using HazId approach. Authors stated that the proposed method helped in reducing cost of safety analysis through the use of technologies such as case-based reasoning, ontology, and natural language processing. The results showed the benefits of the proposed approach when combined with a good ontology as it supports experience reusability for carrying out the analysis of safety and allowing the early detection of hazards within the system. Authors in [17] used a general requirement analysis based on the notion of concern to interpret the approach to system requirements elicitation on business goals. Authors further discuss the concerns to use elicit information about system requirements from stakeholders.
The work focuses on IS safety using the notion of concern but our proposed work is focused on the notion of popular RE methods for misuse case.
Misuse cases are popular RE techniques aimed at satisfying safety issues within the IS RE process. It can also be referred to as unpleasant events leading to damage within a system [17] . The original purpose of misuse cases was to identify security threats [17] , [18] but has also been used in safety-related problems. This is evident in the work of a few researchers in [19] and [20] . In [21] the authors compared the performance of misuse cases to a popular safety analysis technique such as FMEA. While [23] combined the CORAS project misuse cases with other UML notations for safety analysis. Authors in [24] conducted a controlled experiment for safety hazard identification using a use case diagrams and textual use cases. The study confirmed that textual use cases gave a better performance in terms of identification of major failure modes or threats. The lightweight approach to misuse case textual description makes the investigation of hazards more detailed with an overall idea of the risk implicit in the misuse cases for the stakeholders [17] .
Casey [25] conducted a qualitative analysis of misuse cases of LOPA (Layers of Protection Analysis) in reducing spills in pipelines. They further identified the shortfalls associated with the misuse of LOPA in pipelines. Author discussed five different scenarios of misuse in this context. The study concluded that majority of misuse cases in LOPA appear as a result of inexperienced engineers and, in addition, years of practical experience is a major requirement for application of risk assessment techniques.
Macher et al. [29] presented a combined method for safety and security analysis in the early development stage in an automotive domain thus identifying cyber-security threats and safety measure. The study combined the automotive Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) Approach with security domain STRIDE approach. Authors concluded that the proposed method absolutely improves the unexpected misuse scenarios thereby enhancing the safety analysis in terms of ISO 26262 requirement. Matulevicius [30] presented an extension of misuse cases at both the semantic and syntactic levels to improving modeling language to effectively handle and manage security risk concepts. The extensions are executed using UML stereotypes and the main conclusion was that textual misuse cases capture more safety failure modes than graphical misuse cases.
This study leveraged on identified limitations of existing studies thereby taking an extra step to propose model to assess the risks of identified hazards before proposing safety requirements. Moreover, none of the aforementioned approaches constructively includes risk assessment in IS engineering practices from the RE phase, which invariably guides the subsequent development phases. Considering risks during RE phase of IS development frequently appears as very subjective due to expert assessments and judgments since, experts' assessments play a crucial role in quantitative risk analysis and decision [31] . 
IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methodology adopted in this work is lightweight and with an impact on mainstream software developers. We extensively conducted a survey of concepts and build a model for Risk-based Safety Requirement Engineering (R-SRE). R-SRE is an acronym expressing the integration of risk assessment in the requirement engineering phase. We have created a template for documenting R-SRE using scenario-based requirements representation in the system definition. Based on the scenario basic paths, we propose a misuse case based consequential analysis approach to systematically identify exceptional paths in association to safety hazards using guiding questions. The exceptional paths are referred to as unintentional misuse cases. We have adopted aggregated probability and risk values to assign a probability to a use case since probability and risk are originally qualified for each scenario path of a use case. Considering safety risk assessment during the RE process, we carry out qualitative risk estimation by expert judgments and by taking some influencing factors into consideration which are somehow subjective.
The proposed methodology includes four major phases as depicted in figure 1.
1) PHASE1: CONCEPTS SURVEY AND ALIGNMENT
This research study begins by extensively investigating the state of the art in safety risk analysis domain to harvest the relevant concepts in this domain. The concepts from different sources will be aligned together to form the foundation for the integrated model. Sources of concepts are safety standards, safety frameworks, etc.
2) PHASE 2:
The aligned concepts from step (1) form the basis for the conceptual model defined in this step. The conceptual model was defined as a UML class diagram.
3) PHASE 3: RISK-BASED MISUSE CASE MODEL In this step, we tried to understand how the misuse case can enhance safety risk management and requirement formulation. We identified the lacks in misuse case for this mission and then propose new concepts and notations to make up the lacks so that it can be suitable for the task. Phases 2 and 3 can be repeated as shown by the downward and upward arrows between them.
4) PHASE 4: EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED MODEL
The goal is the evaluation of the proposed model using a case study from a safety-critical domain, the health care systems.
A. SURVEY OF CONCEPTS
The extraction of concepts in safety risk assessment was focused on the combination of relevant and standard materials. The category of documents available support safety risk management of systems but not directly IS safety risk. We consider safety standards, safety analysis techniques and safety RE techniques.
1) SAFETY STANDARDS
These standards are aimed at promoting and assuring the safety of the system's activities, products, and the overall processes within an IS. These are basically required and stated by a regulatory body either optional or statutory. In addition, they contain safety specific terminologies. This study further describes the highlights of terminology for reference purposes.
-MIL-STD-882D [36] Standard Practice for System Safety: These standards are documents which are required for creating and implementing a safety program mostly for the purpose of detecting hazards within a system and therefore enforcing design requirements and management controls in preventing mishaps by reducing hazards or associated risks.
-ISO/IEC 15026 standard [32] : It introduces the idea of software requirements integrity levels. It also helps to describe the relations to integrity, characterizing the processes for controlling software integrity levels and requirements, and finally integrates requirements on every single process.
The basic idea of a risk management approach in the ISO/IEC 15026 standard is specifically to ensure a systematic and structured risk management process, ranging from risk analysis to set up a treatment plan. The risk management procedure required by the ISO/IEC 15026 consists of:
• Risk Analysis: entails identifying threat and analysis its occurrence and consequence thus leading to risk calculation.
• Risk Evaluation: concludes based on tolerance decisions.
• Risk Control: comprises of system and software integrity level determination and its conclusion is based on software integrity requirements determination.
-IEEE 1228, Standard for Software Safety Plans [37] : It application ranges from the context of the scheme utilized in developing, procuring, maintaining, and retiring of safetycritical software such as failure software products could result in a broad negative impact, loss of life, serious harm, etc. In addition, this standard requires that ready-planning within the context of the system safety program. This standard focuses on the safety aspects of the software. However, there is no exceptional provision for the software needed in the areas of parallel processors or distributed systems.
2) SAFETY ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
Recently, several techniques/ approach had been adopted for safety analysis. These existing analysis techniques can be classified into quantitative and qualitative techniques. The study only discusses on the most commonly used techniques as shown below:
-Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOP): HAZOP is used for hazard identification via the implementation of a formal systematic method [6] , [15] . HAZOP adopts Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) objectives on the system design view, not on the functional requirements which are the basis for identifying the failure.
-Functional Hazards Assessment (FHA) [40] : In Functional Hazards Assessment, there are three common categories for possible failures which include: loss of function; available function when not required; and lastly, the wrong operation of the function. These categories of failure are based on the fact that some levels of system failure are identified but they do not support a detailed decision for identifying failure as 'wrong operation' for likely failures. Moreover, considering functions alone for the identification of hazards condition is not sufficient since there may be other hazards that are not connected with a specific function of the system e.g. wildfire.
-Fault Tree Analysis (FTA): This method is based on determining events that must happen so as to realize a desired or undesired outcome [4] . In addition, this method is based on the deductive approach in analyzing events varying from the all-purpose to specific events. FTA has established the potentials of differentiating between events based on AND-OR gate. However, FTA presents quantitative facts and in addition evaluates the likelihood of obtaining top events with a high probability of well-known data. -Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) [22] , [39] : it is commonly used in a variety of industries for Risk Management, where simple quantification of risk is insufficient, and where identification of root causes of risks and means of mitigation are paramount. FMEA is one of the most useful and effective tools for developing designs, processes and services. The goal of FMEA is to align the risks as closely as possible with its source. This enables the determination of the root cause of the risk, and allows the selection of ways to detect the occurrence of a particular failure and/or to find options to prevent or mitigate the effects of a particular failure. Good FMEA methodology allows the identification and documentation of potential failures of a system and their resulting effects. It also facilitates the assessment of the potential failure to determine actions that would reduce severity, reduce occurrence, and increase detection.
3) SAFETY RE FRAMEWORKS
We have discussed the existing frameworks for safety RE in section (III).
B. EXTRACTION AND ALIGNMENT OF SURVEYED CONCEPTS
After our literature survey ranging from safety analysis techniques and safety standards to safety RE techniques, we have extracted and aligned concepts that are related to systems safety risk management (RM). The basic RM process is outlined in the previous section. Our focus is mainly on risk assessment for now. According to the standard safety risk assessment process [33] , the second and third steps take care of risk assessment. Keeping this in mind, we shall consider the core concepts that are related to these steps based on the category of literature that was reviewed. The alignment of system safety risk concepts with the reviewed literatures and standards is shown in Table 1 .
C. SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS
System safety risk management process is deceptively simple but entails a great deal of work. The initial step is based on systems context establishment in risk analysis while the next step involves the identification of hazards which involves finding sources of risk.
The third step is the risk assessment with the aim of determining their causes, assessing hazard severity and the probability of occurrence. While the last step is the risk management which is to evaluate the risks, determining hazard control, monitor and review. It attempts to identify and prioritize hazards severity based on the greatest probability of occurrence [34] .
V. AN INTEGRATED MODEL FOR R-SRE A. R-SRE CONCEPTUAL MODEL
Eliciting safety requirements and managing IS safety risk is a relatively unexplored aspect of IS development. The key point is the construction of an integrated semantic model for safety assessment and requirements formulation. The final sets of concepts elicited and aligned in the previous section are parts of the ones used to construct the conceptual model. However, this set of concepts is not a goal in itself because it may increase as we continue with the research work as depicted in Figure 2 .
The connectors between the concepts displayed in figure 1 show the association between the concepts. UML class diagram notation is used to describe the improved usemisuse case model for R-SRE as depicted in Figure 2 . The classes are represented with rectangular boxes with the purpose of representing the concepts in the proposed model. We propose the following definitions for the Concepts. 1) Use case Scenarios (US) represents operational instances of system use. 2) Unintentional misuse cases (UMUC) are unplanned acts or events that can cause accidental harm (undesired outcome) to the system. This is synonymous to hazard.
In this paper, we may use these words interchangeably. Example: accidental alteration of data (user level), server failure (system level). We advocated that UMUC is more relevant to be identified with a source since an accident does not necessarily need an agent to manifest as happens with a flood or a component failure. Even at the user level, the occurring accident is not intentional. 3) Vulnerability (V) could be described as scenario path or system components that can represent a weakness which can provoke the occurrence of an unintentional misuse case. The word vulnerability was rarely used in the field of safety except in emergency risk management. We introduce relations 'provoke' to express this in our conceptual model. The relations ''provoke'' imply that vulnerability was not intentionally used to harm the system as against the normal 'exploit' relation. The vulnerability can be human, technical or physical. Examples are 'incompetence', 'lack of fire detector' and 'wooden furniture' respectively. 4) Risk (R) can be described as the possibility or effects of an accident based on severity and UMUC probability. 5) UMUC Source (UMUCS) can be characterized as an object with the likelihood of causing events that may lead to accidents hence harming the system. It could be a human or non-human object. 6) Undesired Outcome (UO) is a series of events or event leading to loss of life, hurt, occupational illness, or causality relating to disaster with equipment or property some of which include: building collapse, wrong treatment, etc. 7) UMUC probability (UMUCP) is the combined possibility of a typical event occurrence which develops a particular UMUC. 8) Undesired Outcome severity (UOS) is a consequence estimate of the least credible outcome which could result by a particular UMUC. 9) Safety Requirements (SR) are statements describing constraints that are necessary to achieve the required risk reduction or elimination. 10) Risk is composed of hazard severity and UMUC probability. A given severity can only be related to a given risk but UMUC probability can be related to many risks. UMUC is the cause of undesired outcome. A given UMUC can only be related to a source. A likely vulnerability could provoke several UMUC thereby leading to various causes of undesired outcome.
B. R-SRE MODELLING PROCESS
This section presents the systematic steps for modelling R-SRE. However, in this paper, it is hard to give a comprehensive direction with instances based on an existing case study due to the length limitation. Therefore, this study focuses on discussing the steps by introducing new concepts to the use-misuse case technique, therefore, fixing existing limitations. The entire modelling process is depicted in Figure 3 . Figure 3 shows a detailed and simple understanding of the conceptual model of the safety system and the concept definitions.
Step 1 (Representation of Core System Functionality): Central to the establishment of risk-based safety requirements is the system definition which includes the identification of stakeholders. These stakeholders are those who may be affected or be affected by the system. This step defines the extent of the proposed system and determines stakeholders' aspirations, expectations, interest, values and circumstances. Each of the stakeholders has one role or other to play in the system. We explore a use case approach to define the purposes of the system as required by the stakeholders. Each of the stakeholders has one role or the other to play in the system. We explore a use case approach to define the purposes of the system as required by the stakeholders. For each of the stakeholders' requirements, we identify core use cases and outline scenarios and document the scenario for each core use case. Each of the use cases must be ranked as either essential or non-essential. This will help in prioritizing safety requirements. Scenarios represent an operational instance of system use. In order to identify the components and the actions involved in each use case, we use a form of scenario graph. Without a detailed analysis of how and who will use the IS, it is impossible to determine the safety hazards and without safety hazards, it will be difficult to identify safety requirements.
Step 2 (Identification of Unintentional Misuse Cases): This step involves two basic steps; scoping of vulnerability and identification of the misuse cases and the corresponding undesired conditions that may occur as a result of the misuse cases by following the misuse case based consequential analysis approach. The basic process involved in the unintentional misuse cases identification is depicted in figure 4 .
The approach takes each category of UMUC source in figure 5 to identify a UMUC that can be generated by that source and identify the next sequences of events that could lead from the UMUC to an accident or incident with respect to a use case scenario basic path: the analysis is consequential and the search is bottom-up.
Common UMUC sources are natural (e.g. earthquake, wildfire, etc.) human (e.g. accidental acts (unintentional data alteration), abusive acts by the stakeholders within the system e.g. overreliance on IS), etc.), and environmental (e.g. power failure, water leakage, etc.). To systematically achieve this we present a set of guide questions based on the UMUC hierarchy information presented in figure 5 . The two questions are WHAT? and HOW? They guide the UMUC brainstorming section for each of the use case scenario paths.
According to the hazards hierarchy information, we have two basic sources. The human source (accidental acts and abusive acts) and the non-human source (natural, environmental and system). The human is majorly concerned with human interaction with the software interface. For the non-human sources we used the following guide questions: 1) What can go wrong in (nature, environment and hardware) that can make it impossible for the system to carry out its tasks safely? 2) What subsequent events can result from the result of question 1 that will directly affect the safe completion of the particular scenario basic path? After the answer to the question what, we go to the question how? 3) How can the identified condition affect the safe execution of the scenario path under consideration? For each of the undesired event that is unrevealed, a named event is defined with a small text which introduces the situation in a more detailed use case scenario path. This paper, however, proposes a template for the documentation. For the human hazard sources we use the following questions: 1) What are the acts that stakeholders can be involved in that can affect the safe performance of the intended system? 2) What unwanted events can result from the result of question 1 that will directly affect the safe performance and utilization of the system with respect to the scenario path? 3) How can the identified events affect the safe operation, performance and utilization of the system with respect to the scenario path? Considering the other types of error within a system, it is impossible to predict future deployment/ use of a system, and the likely causes of undesired outcome. However, it is crucial to collect as many information as possible about the behaviour of the proposed system and to presume that this information will aid in detecting causes of most unintentional misuse cases before they lead to accidents.
During this process, there may need to involve safety engineers because the knowledge of the requirements engineers and stakeholders may not be sufficient. Also, there may need to consult some generic hazards catalogues in order to have an exhaustive list to boost their knowledge and compare with.
It is necessary to be specific when describing the hazards, the more reason why we adopted a consequential analysis approach so that the people involved in hazard identification can ask questions focusing on the root hazard hierarchy. Figure 6 gives an illustration of the application of the guide questions.
Scoping of Vulnerability: this involves examining a use case scenario path and system components in order to know whether it can provoke any of the UMUCs. The word 'provokes' is used on each use case to investigate any harmful action it can lead to. Once this is discovered, that particular use case is termed as vulnerable use case. Example: 'view patient information' (vulnerable use case) which may provoke 'overreliance on IS' (abusive act) which may lead to 'wrong treatment' (mishap);
Step 3 (Analysis of Unintentional Misuse Cases): The purpose of analyzing unintentional misuse cases is to provide information for the assessment, evaluation and treatment of risks because not all risks are equally serious. The input to this step is a description of the unintentional misuse case. The analysis includes likelihood and severity determination.
Determine Probability: The goal of this step is to determine the probability of hazards taking several influence factors into account. We determine probability qualitatively without using number by considering some factors. This is because very few risks will have a quantifiable probability. Regarding this, the following factors have been identified.
(1) The occurrence of Predecessor Events (PE i ) that create the hazards (H j ) represented as PE i H j Where:
The extent of the impact the hazard under consideration will have can be determined by the number of users (U k ) and how often the Events are performed by the users this can be represented as:
(2) Each hazard H j may be provoked by one or more vulnerability (V i ) in order for it to be effective, thus the existence of vulnerabilities significantly aid the hazard probability.
The likelihood of non-human source hazards like natural, environmental can be determined by the prior probability of the corresponding hazards gotten from historical hazard data with respect to the environmental and natural hazards in that location including lessons learned from another system. Also data of failure with respect to the kind of hardware they may intend to use in the IS. The result of each hazard probability is represented as a distribution of the adopted rating according to [38] (e.g. frequent, probable, occasional, remote, and improbable). We suggest the following risk descriptor for the estimation of the hazard probability with respect to the occurrence of predecessor events which is determined by the number of users with respect to that event.
--improbable: n <5 --remote: 5<= n <50 --occasional, but significant: 50<= n < 100 --probable: 100<= n <500 --frequent: >= 500 Figure 7 shows the proposed model of determining the hazard probabilities with respect to the factors highlighted earlier.
Determine Severity: Hazard analysis is carried out here by determining the severity of each undesired outcome, A severity category is assigned to each accident identified, we assign (catastrophic, critical, marginal and negligible) based on the level of injury incurred. In this case, we use the MIL-STD-882D safety standard [36] . Scenario graph allows us to easily identify the components that are affected by the undesired outcome of hazards.
Step 4 (Assessment of Risk): Risk has been mathematically summarized as the product of the possibility of the hazard, and the loss of associated consequence of undesired outcome. Therefore, the risks associated with the hazards are been assessed using the risk assessment matrix recommended in [38] and the impact of risk is been rated within the scale (high, medium, low, negligible).
Step 5 (Identification of Risk-Based Safety Requirements): Based on the risk assessment and the hazards described in steps 3 and 4 we identify safety requirements that will effectively ensure either the elimination of the hazards or maximum exposure control. The requirements must be specific to the hazard concerned. At this stage, the requirements engineer should not use safety control terminology to avoid being engrossed with how safety requirements will be actualized. New misuse cases may be introduced by a specific safety requirement this has to be subjected to analysis again so that more requirements can be identified.
C. PROPOSED TEMPLATE FOR R-SRE DOCUMENTATION
As recommended in [17] , this study adapted the lightweight approach to misuse case textual description with little modifications to make the template more elaborate and extensive in order to accommodate the additional concepts included due to the risk assessment involved. We proposed a 6-tuple template for the documentation of the outcome of the R-SRE modelling process. It consists of the following six parts (US, UMUC, UO, UOS, UMUCP, RISK, SR). The components of the template correspond with the concepts of the proposed model. The relevance of the template was further illustrated in our case study.
Guide to Using the Template: In column 1, Use case Scenario (US) paths were recorded and any of the use case scenario path which has been identified to be vulnerable is asterisked.
In column 2, we record the description of the UMUC associated with the performance of the scenario path in column 1. If there is more than one hazard to a scenario path, then each hazard must be numbered alphanumerically as shown in the template. E.g. it quite obvious that scenario path 1 has two hazards associated with it. The source of the hazard should be put in the bracket in front of each hazard.
In column 3, the Undesired Outcome (UO) that may result from each hazard is recorded. This must be brief and specific as well. The hazard severity table adopted in this paper [36] can act as guiding words.
In column 4 we record the probability of occurrence of each of the UMUC in column 2 based on the descriptor used in the adopted standard. There may be more than one hazard for a scenario path, each hazard probability will be numbered alphanumerically and the aggregate probability of the hazards will be recorded for that scenario path.
In column 5 we record the category of hazard severity and probability into the Hazard Risk Index (HRI) in order to qualitatively assess the risk. The value of Risk (R) is recorded for that particular hazard. The aggregate value of all risks for all hazards of all the scenario paths will represent the risk inherent in that use case.
In column 6, based on the risk assessment and the hazards described in column 2, we provide Safety Requirements (SR). In many cases there may be more than one recommended safety requirements for a use case scenario path; as a result of this, each safety requirement will also be numbered alphanumerically to associate the requirements with the proper hazard and scenario path.
VI. CASE STUDY
We use the popular MHCPMS system as in [35] . There are key and inevitable issues with respect to the development of this kind of systems. Some of them include: 1) Update of information must be accurate (error-free);
2) The update must be carried out immediately when there are new data; 3) Reports must be up to date every time; The stakeholders and their roles are well spelt out in the description of the case study. We have selected an example involving the doctor as the stakeholder. We assume there is a patient that was sick elsewhere and brought to one of the clinics but not his regular clinic. The doctor needs to view the treatment plan in order to know the right medication to prescribe. The focus of the illustration was to show the use of concepts and modelling process outlined in sections IVB. The example is targeted for identification of unintentional misuse case, safety risk and safety requirements at the user level. The example shows the selection of a core doctor responsibility towards the patient (view treatment plan), its scenario basic paths and scenario graph and the succeeding unintentional misuse case identification, safety risk and safety requirements relating to the single responsibility of the doctor (view treatment plan).
Modeling The scenario path shows the step by step execution of this use case and how the doctor relates to the internet-enabled local computer to get the requested information or data about the patient. We use the scenario graph in figure 8 to represents the actions involved in accomplishing the stated use case.
From Figure 8 , the system components involved in this use case can be identified from the scenario graph. They are user, local computer, internet and the host server. identified hazard and the analysis are recorded in the template proposed in section 4C. The documentation for this case study is shown in Table 2 . The analysis yielded different severity for the identified hazards.
Identification: the hazard identified in column 2 items 5 is accidental acts. This hazard presents no visible effects on another system. However, accidental acts are listed as an action in which previous user input erroneous data for a patient so mistreatment is likely and can result in ill-health or death.
Analysis: catastrophic is in the severe hazard class in column 3, item 5, since it involves death; a possible outcome of the hazard in column 2 item 5. There is also a high potential for frequent erroneous data input on the basis of the proposed model for determining hazard probability regarding the goals and purpose of the system, Figure 9 presents a brief illustration of the use misuse case identification based on the guiding questions.
The first part of the illustration above indicate the source of the UMUC, the second part is the answer to the first What question, the third part is the answer to the second What question and the fourth part is the answer to the How question.
The second question must be repeated until basic events which can affect the safe intention of the scenario path are discovered.
Modelling Process Step4: Risk Assessment Based on the likelihood of this hazard and severity categorization, the risk exposure of the scenario path 5 in column 1 is 'high'.
Modelling Process Step5: Identification of safety requirements.
We identify new safety requirements for hazards and hazardous conditions. Most of the safety requirements are performance constraints.
This example only shows the evaluation of the use case 'view treatment plan'. The results of other use case scenario paths are documented in the template in Table2.
A rating scale has to be adopted for risk categorization in order to determine the risk for a use case so that an aggregate value can be calculated and risk level can then be assigned.
VII. DISCUSSION
The approach presented in this paper starts from a use case, analyze it in the form of a scenario and specifically identify UMUC that can thwart the successful completion of each of the scenario path. This method aims to eliminate or control the risk of UMUC exposure during the IS RE process.
This method clearly establishes positive safety contacts with users of the system and also helps the organization to prepare for planned safety observations during the exploitation period of the system.
The use case scenario-based approach to requirement representation allows hazards to be extensively and systematically identified for each of the system functions leaving no stone unturned. This provides a way of coping in an efficient and reliable way with the complexity of functional requirements in some cases. The proposed template clearly presents the results of the safety risk assessment and the proposed safety requirements were based on the results. The scenario graph makes easier the identification of the scope of the damage by accidents or mishaps. The limitation of this paper is the simplicity of the adopted example. This invariably acquaints the author as possibly incurring in bias and streamlining example to suit his purpose. However, the example is within the context of an organization with significant safety concerns.
It is worth noting that there is a kind of commonality between safety and security. In the course of this research, we discovered that some safety risks impact system security and some security risk impact system safety. These two situations can be referred to as security-impacting safety risks and safety-impacting security risks. For the later, if the security properties (availability and integrity) cannot be guaranteed then it may be difficult to certify that a system is safe. Analogously, a momentary system failure implies nonavailability (security compromise) and accidental erroneous input implies compromise of information integrity (security objective). We think clearance is needed on this issue.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the question ''How safe is safe enough'' has no simple answer considering the primary objectives of a risk-based safety RE which is to ensure the highest safety level, reduced operation time, cost and effectiveness. It is also important to understand that other stakeholders that will be involved in the use of the system should also be added to the task. Lack of required participation between organizational departments could lead to the failure of the IS or might lead to poor prediction or detection of all likely system safety risks.
This study developed a template for documenting R-SRE using scenario-based requirements representation in the system definition. We based the study on the scenario basic paths and proposed a misuse case-based consequential analysis approach to systematically identify exceptional paths in association to safety hazards using guiding questions. In addition, we adopted aggregated probability and aggregated risk values to assign a probability to a use case, since probability and risk are originally qualified for each scenario path of a use case. The proposed approach and model can be combined with FHA techniques to boost its capability. The future recommendation is targeted towards designing a framework that can aid IS risk monitoring with respect to safety and security.
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